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SOCIAL ARCHITECTURE, JUDICIAL PEER
EFFECTS AND THE "EVOLUTION" OF THE LAW:
TOWARD A POSITIVE THEORY OF JUDICIAL
SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Daniel M. Katz, Derek K. Stafford, & Eric Provins*
Building upon the themes of this symposium, as well as a growing
extant literature demonstrating the common law displays properties
of a complex system,' we believe existing theories of judicial
decision-making and legal change would benefit from the concepts
and techniques typically reserved for the study of complexity. Among
possible approaches, network analysis offers one manner of
representing the interactions between various entities across a
* Daniel M. Katz, J.D., M.P.P. University of Michigan. Ph.D. Pre-Candidate, Department of
Political Science and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan; Derek K.
Stafford, Ph.D. Pre-Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan; Eric Provins,
B.S. Candidate, University of Michigan.
1. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994) (discussing
chaos theory in the context of capital market regulation); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1995) (discussing legal evolution and invoking both path
dependence and systems theory); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures: Lending
Discrimination Laws as a Test Case, 12 J.L. & POL. 637 (1996) (employing chaos theory to review
legislative responses to alleged lending discrimination); J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using
Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for
Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) (discussing both complexity and the general evolutionary
model); David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the
Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2000) (uncovering the fractal structure of
citations to precedent in judicial opinions); Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
309 (2007) (demonstrating the distribution of citations across the roughly four million cases in American
law as consistent with the power law distribution); Elizabeth Leicht, Gavin Clarkson, Kerby Shedden &
M. E. J. Newman, Large-Scale Structure of Time Evolving Citation Networks, 59 EUROPEAN J. OF PHYS.
B 75 (2007) (mapping the structure of the United States Reports and detecting temporal communities in
case to case citations). See also Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation:
An Empirical Study of the Dynamics ofInterpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848 (2005); Daniel F. Spulber
& Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach,
99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1687 (2005); Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of
Valuation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357 (2005). For an extensive list of
scholarship compiled by Professor Ruhl, see Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law, Complex
Adaptive Systems in Literature for Law and Social Sciences,
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/seal/resources/readingscomplex.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
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complex adaptive landscape. 2 Specifically, as applied to the path of
the common law as well as theories of judicial decision-making, the
networks paradigm helps evaluate the manner in which individual
level judge choice maps to the judiciary's aggregate doctrinal
outputs.
3
Of course, to the extent individual decision-making is driven by
factors entirely intrinsic to a given case and a given jurist,4 the study
of interactions is arguably trivial as the description of the aggregate
would reflect little more than the summation of individual
preferences in a manner consistent with the institution's aggregation
rule. It is far more likely, however, that judicial choice is, at least in
part, impacted by a combination of jurists who are socially prominent
2. The analysis of social networks is long standing with notable early work conducted by scholars
such as Jacob Moreno, Fritz Heider, and Kurt Lewin. See, e.g., JACOB MORENO, WHO SHALL SURVIVE?
(1934) (developing the "sociogram," an apparatus that allows social relationships to be drawn using
analytic geometry); KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951) (extending Moreno's work
and applying a host of mathematical techniques including graph theory, topology, and set theory).
Popular accounts of networks concepts can largely be attributed to the work of Stanley Milgram. See
Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, 22 PSYCHOL. TODAY 61 (1967). Milgram is often credited
with coining "six degrees of separation." However, many attribute the term to Hungarian author, Frigyes
Karinthy, whose volume of short stories invoked such concepts. See FRIGYES KARINTHY, MINDEN
MASKEPPEN VAN [EVERYTHING IS DIFFERENT] (1929). A host of recent popular literature continues the
public's widespread interest in network science. See generally FORBES, Networks, May 7, 2007
(devoting its Ninetieth Anniversary Issue to the "New" Age of Networks). For a non-exhaustive list of
recent popular books in the subject, see also ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE
OF NETWORKS (2002); MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING
SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); and MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000). Recent developments within the academy have also driven
increased interest in network analysis. Among these developments the work of Watts and Strogatz is of
utmost interest. See Duncan J. Watts & Stephen H. Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of 'Small World'
Networks, 393 NATURE 440 (1998). See also Laszlo Barabdsi & Reka Albert, Emergence of Scaling in
Random Networks, 286 SCIENCE 509 (1999). For instructive texts on the subject see, e.g., THE
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS (Mark Newman, Albert-Laszlo Barabisi, & Duncan J.
Watts, eds., 2006); STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (1994).
3. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MIRCOMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978).
4. Early public law scholarship often modeled judicial choice as a function of judge and case level
variables. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Later work inspired by New Institutional Economics (NIE) describes how
judicial choice is in part conditioned on the institutional environment a given actor faces. See, e.g., LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL.,
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). These approaches do not
explicitly model social-dynamics.
[Vol. 24:4
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and socially proximate.5 While in some forms of network structure
such "peer effects" are limited, in many states of the social world,
they are supremely consequential. The precursor to evaluating
potential doctrinal consequences is a classificatory effort designed to
determine the micro implications of a given observed macro
landscape.
6
Section I provides a brief overview of the complex system
paradigm while simultaneously reviewing existing theories of judicial
decision-making and common law evolution. Section II considers a
series of classic network structures. Among the possibilities
considered herein are random graphs, clustered graphs, as well as
models built upon processes of preferential attachment. Drawing
from the larger complexity literature, Section II also describes the
processes of self-organization likely responsible for generating each
of these network structures.
7
With an understanding of these possible "states of the world" in
mind, Section III concludes with a consideration of judicial decision-
making, arguing "the path of the law" 8-from emergence to
convergence-is conditioned, in part, upon the nature of self-
organized social architecture that relevant decisional actors confront.
In all, we believe "architecture matters." Thus, our broad sweep of
the possibility frontier should help identify the conditions under
5. Recent work in the public law literature acknowledges a need for contextual understandings of
judicial decision making. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial
Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1971-1999,
Paper Presented at the 2003 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (Apr. 3-6, 2003)
(manuscript on file with author) (applying a "social economics approach" to the behavior of judges on
the U.S. Court of Appeals). Cameron and Cummings cite a number of studies which "cast considerable
doubt on what might be called the traditional political science approach to decision-making on collegial
courts." Id. See, e.g., Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of
Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717
(1997). Of course, other actors and institutions also impact a given jurist's conception of what
constitutes a sound legal rule.
6. See generally SCHELLING, supra note 3.
7. Of course, since formal institutions "matter," it is certainly fair to assert that not all organization
here is "self-organization."
8. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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which network effects are present in the development of the common
law.
I. COMPLEXITY THEORY INTERSECT JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AND
LEGAL CHANGE
Describing the mechanisms that coalesce to produce change in
the common law has been the charge of a diverse set of scholars.
From within the legal academy and across allied disciplines such as
political science, sociology, anthropology, physics and economics, an
extensive set of positive and normative scholarship attempts to
characterize global judicial outputs and the interconnected layer of
actors and institutions that collectively generate the canon. As a
means to introduce complexity theory and network analysis, this
section engages the public law literature arguing many theories of
judicial decision-making and common law development could be
improved through consideration of law as a complex adaptive system.
A. On the "Evolution" of the Law
This symposium reflects the initial organized volume of
scholarship applying complexity to enrich legal theory. As it offers
an analytical framework to consider the possibility of law's
adaptation and potential evolution, the extant complexity literature
provides a number of illuminating examples relevant to modeling the
common law's stasis and occasional doctrinal changes.
For example, consider existing models of common law
development with reference to H20, as phase transitions of water are
a useful manner for understanding how micro processes of self-
organization can generate systemic changes. Specifically, while an
analysis of individual water molecules provides information about the
transition from solid into liquid or liquid into vapor, such a micro-
analysis is not illustrative of broader system-level dynamics. Instead,
careful observation from the proper vantage point demonstrates how
[Vol. 24:4
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molecules interact very differently at specific temperatures (i.e. at the
freezing and boiling points). 9 Phase transitions in water are
emergent-from ice to water and from water to steam. Once a given
temperature threshold has been crossed, molecules self-organize in a
completely different manner than immediately prior to attaining the
critical 32F and 212'F thresholds.
While physical systems offer interesting insights, social systems
are also capable of complex, adaptive behavior. Consider Professor
Axelrod's work on the evolution of cooperation.' 0 Axelrod explores
humanity and governance by pondering the Hobbesian state of
nature. Hobbes based many of his conclusions concerning the
brutality of the natural state of man based upon interactions between
unfamiliar agents operating under a lack of centralized authority.
Axelrod argues this initial uncertainty is akin to the risks and rewards
contained in a prisoner's dilemma. Accordingly, Axelrod considers
the conditions under which one would observe cooperation despite a
lack of institutionalized central authority and prior communication. In
short, without large discount rates, actors cooperate when the number
of interactions between agents is indefinite. These uncertain intervals
allow players to adapt their behavior and punish or reward the other
actor through the renowned Tit-for-Tat strategy.
Given the introduction of greater numbers of actors with whom
interaction is possible, self-sorting of interaction, easy exit strategies,
reputation effects and selection based upon fitness, the system will
evolve to different ends based upon the critical masses of defectors
and cooperators. The adaptive behavior of the individual actors is the
key to this evolutionary process. Linking back to the common law,
we contend the manner in which doctrine changes cannot be divorced
from the manner of self-organized social structure relevant actors
confront. The micro-motives of federal jurists and the professional
and social interactions between jurists, at least in part, help generate
systemic changes in the common law.
9. See, e.g., PIERRE PAPON, JACQUES LEBLOND, PAUL H. E. MEUER, THE PHYSICS OF PHASE
TRANSITION (1999).
10. See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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Under the conditions described here, the "evolution" of the law
does not refer to some normative upward ascension to good. It does
not necessarily imply efficiency or quality. Rather, our invocation of
evolution refers to a dynamic process observed when a characteristic
or attribute increases or decreases the probabilities for reproduction
or replication, and that trait is passed on with a greater or lesser
probability through the reproduction process."l When certain factors
exist within a system, the trait or characteristic will be selected and
greater proportions of the agents within that system will take on that
characteristic until that population reaches some ceiling based on the
external environment. 12
This process is often described as fitness landscape hill-climbing.
Imagine an agent is standing on some sort of hill that is surrounded
by many other hills. While the agent's goal is to reach the hill's
highest point, assume it is midnight and thus difficult to determine in
which direction to proceed. The agent, however, is not without any
guidance as other than the exact top of a hill, the angle of the ground
underneath his or her feet indicates the direction of assent. Given this
information, an agent can walk until the angle levels whereby the
exact top of the given hill is reached. Yet, since the individual cannot
see anything, he or she is unable to determine if a given hill peak is
the tallest mountain in the known world, or the smallest foothill. 13
Without any additional information, the agent cannot justify any
strategy other than remaining at the given hill's peak. Thus, the actor
will hold steady until an exogenous force knocks him or her from the
peak and carries the agent to another position on the landscape. Once
in this new position, the process of hill-climbing begins anew.
11. Although evolutionary dynamics are widely documented as being non-normative, for a more
detailed discussion on evolutionary analysis from the perspective of the complex systems paradigm, see
PER BAK, How NATURE WORKS (1997) and JOHN MAYNARD SMITH & EORS SZATHMARY, THE ORIGINS
OF LIFE (1999).
12. For a more detailed explanation of these evolutionary dynamics, see Mark Newman, Self-
organized Criticality, Evolution and the Fossil Extinction Record, 263 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON B,
1605 (1996); Mark Newman, The Power of Design, 405 NATURE 412 (2000).
13. For a discussion in greater detail on fitness landscapes and hill-climbing in the context of
evolution, see MARTIN A. NOwAK, EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS: EXPLORING THE EQUATIONS OF LIFE
(2006).
[Vol. 24:4
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While not always agent centric or the byproduct of conscious
choices, the evolution of social systems often follow this methodical
hill-climbing process. If characteristics considered normatively poor
lead to greater reproduction, then those bad traits will be considered
fit. Thus, in the phrase "survival of the fittest," fitness simply refers
to what reproduces or replicates until some exogenous or endogenous
shock resets the basis for reproduction. Of course, it is possible the
common law tracks towards efficiency, justice or some other
normatively attractive criteria. However, to the extent "evolution" is
the causal mechanism, this tendency must be embedded in the
relevant fitness landscape.
Legal scholars have long described changes in the common law
using Darwinian evolutionary terms.14 Whether speaking loosely or
formally, many existing descriptions of legal change posit that law
has a trajectory. Specifically, the literature commonly evaluates the
outputs of the legal system and links them to some process of
purification 15 or move toward efficiency.' 6 Of course, the conditions
14. See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW (2005). "In championing an
evolutionary methodology, common lawyers trade off the established theories of biological development
and benefit from its scientific pedigree .... Perhaps because of its own insecurities, jurisprudence
jumped on the Darwinian bandwagon of the nineteenth century more quickly and more zealously than
most other disciplines. Indeed, from the pioneering work of Maine, Holmes, Wigmore, and Corbin
through to more recent technical efforts, the evolutionary motif has always loomed large over
jurisprudential efforts to explicate the nature of the common law." Id at 12-13. For a further history, see
id at 13 (citing E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38
(1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985)).
15. As Professor Hutchinson notes, "[t]he leading so-called purist among the elite of modem
jurisprudence is Ronald Dworkin. He has placed the notion that the law works itself pure at the dynamic
core of his legal theory." HUTCHINSON, supra note 14, at 70-71. It is not clear, however, that the law is
working itself pure as the Darwinian program is about selection and adaptation-neither of which is
necessarily related to the matters of morality or justice that occupy much of Dworkin's project.
16. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (1973) (arguing that the common law
tends toward efficiency in the aggregate because jurists maximize efficiency at the individual level).
Subsequent scholars extend these claims. See Robert Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser, & David Lane,
Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent, 10 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1979); George
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). For
a recent attempt to reconcile this puzzle, see Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of
Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43 (2007) (arguing that under a set of conditions legal evolution can
be beneficial even if policy-motivated judges act in an interested fashion.). However, these scholars
acknowledge they "have ignored several institutional features of appellate review that might affect our
results." Id. at 63. Namely, while these scholars identify panel effects as a source for moderation, their
analysis might also engage other factors such as those considered herein.
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necessary to conclude the Darwinian mechanism is the driver, is
fairly strict. The common law may very well be working itself pure
but there is genuine tension between claims of trajectory and the
reliance upon evolutionary mechanisms. 17 In so much as scholars
assert claims that law's evolution is co-extensive with trajectory, the
widespread historical misconceptions embedded in the American
constitutional canon1 8 should provide pause.
The description of evolution offered by the law as a complex
system paradigm makes no such claim of trajectory. Instead, as
discussed above, the key evolutionary criterion is fitness, where
fitness as defined against a given landscape. In the context of legal
doctrine, the burgeoning public law historical institutional
scholarship argues fitness in the context of law's evolution does not
necessarily imply historical precision. Rather, at least some subset of
the common law that persists in the average casebook, and is
disseminated from generation to generation, is of dubious truth-value.
In other words, rather than embracing efficiency or purification,
law's fitness landscape appears to select for reproduction the clean
and simplified legal narratives that can be most easily imparted to the
next generation.
B. Injecting Emergence into Theories of Judicial Decision Making
Although the definition for a complex system can be elusive,'
9
most widely accepted definitions include the concept of emergence.
17. Again, Professor Hutchinson has articulated this point quite succinctly. "[N]ature and law are
simply moving on largely in response to the demands and opportunities of their changing environmental
situation. Neither always getting better (or worse) nor advancing in any particular direction, they are
simply changing." See HUTCHINSON, supra note 14, at 238.
18. In particular, it is fruitful to review recent work analyzing a number of canonical Constitutional
narratives such as the Supreme Court's alleged abandonment of the freeman, the Court's decision in
Lochner, the development of modem First Amendment speech doctrine, and the New Deal "Switch in
Time." Evaluating the record, historical institutional scholarship place long-standing and dominant
accounts under significant scrutiny. See, e.g., Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks?
Rethinking the "State Action" Cases of the Waite Court, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 343 (2007); BARRY
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); MARK A.
GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991).
19. See JOHN H MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 3 (2007).
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Systems display emergence when interactions between components,
at least in part, structure the outputs of the system. Among other
things, emergence offers scientific credence to claims that "the
whole" is different from "the sum of its parts."
With ultimate reference to existing theories of judicial decision-
making, consider some examples of emergence as described across
the complex systems literature. For example, contemplate a
photograph composed of thousands of pixels.21  One could
conceivably zoom close enough to the picture to observe each
individual pixel, but this information, even if studied discretely for
every pixel in the photo, would not necessarily provide insight into
the overall image. Rather, in order to understand the image, it is
necessary to obtain the proper vantage point and observe the
interaction between the pixels. With perspective, a pattern of
meaning ultimately emerges.
Consider also the design of traffic systems. 22 When engineering
transportation structures so as to prevent gridlock, knowledge about a
host of individual level variables including the maximum speed of
vehicles, the disposition of particular drivers, average weather
conditions as well as other factors, provides only partial insight into
the ultimately observed pattern. Instead, it is the interactions between
certain drivers with individual decision rules and car capabilities
together with other conditions that dictate whether an observed macro
pattern of congestion or efficiency will obtain.
20. Multiple disciplines across a variety of intellectual domains include discussions of emergence.
See generally David Chalmers, Strong and Weak Emergence, in THE RE-EMERGENCE OF EMERGENCE:
THE EMERGENTIST HYPOTHESIS FROM SCIENCE TO RELIGION (Philip Clayton & Paul Davies, eds. 2006);
Tom De Wolf & Tom Holvoet, Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising
When Combined, in ENGINEERING SELF-ORGANISING SYSTEMS (Sven A. Brueckner et al., eds. 2005);
STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE (2002); JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE FROM CHAOS
TO ORDER (1998).
21. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 19, at 48.
22. For a further discussion of cross-disciplinary historical uses of complex systems, see Peter A.
Coming, The Re-Emergence of "Emergence ": A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory, 7
COMPLEXITY 18 (2002). See also BRIAN GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE
EVOLUTION OF COMPLEXITY (2001); STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS,
BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2001).
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Returning to the consideration of legal institutions, there are a host
of social scientific approaches to judicial decision-making that
together provide great insight into the relevant individual level
variables that inform judge choice. For example, attitudinalists
observe that judicial decision-making is the singular pursuit of an
individual's partisan policy preferences. 23 "Simply put, Rehnquist
votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall
voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal. 24 In short, the
attitudinal model builds individual policy preferences into the core of
its approach. The strategic institutionalists, while offering a more
nuanced approach to judicial choice, follow a similar individual level
strategy, arguing jurists act strategically in the pursuit of their policy
preferences. 25  Institutionalist theories, while highlighting how
institutional rules sometimes lead constrained actors to deviate from
their unbounded policy preferences, do not consider the dynamic
interplay between the micro and macro and its consequences for
aggregate outputs.
2 6
This is troublesome because judicial decision-making is decision-
making in a judicial hierarchy. Agents across the institution
consistently interact and those interactions undoubtedly consequence
aggregate outputs. An important precursor to gaining leverage on the
empirical implications of this revelation is an effort to develop a
positive theory of judicial social structure. Much like the study of the
pixels or the understanding of traffic systems, existing theories could
benefit from modeling both direct and indirect interactions between
judicial agents. Along with factors identified by behavioral and
strategic institutional scholars, we believe that a holistic model of
judicial decision-making should account for the institution's self-
23. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 4.
24. Id. at 65.
25. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 4; MALTZMAN, supra note 4.
26. For a discrete applied example of the strategic institutional approach, see Daniel M. Katz,
Institutional Rules, Strategic Behavior, and the Legacy of Chief Justice William Rehnquist: Setting the
Record Straight on Dickerson v. United States, 22 J. L. & POL. 303 (2006) (arguing Justice Rehnquist's
decision to support and author the Court's decision in Dickerson should be best understood as a strategic
effort designed to preserve the very exceptions to Miranda the Chief Justice spent roughly three decades
working to secure).
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organized social topology and its role in structuring the emergent and
convergent outputs produced by the aggregate institution.
One manner of quantifying and representing such interactions
between jurists is through the use of network analysis.27 Rooted in
graph theory, network analysis allows scholars to condense
information about interactions and provide graphical and statistical
representations of the broader social landscape. Once operationalized
into depictions of the system, network science offers a variety of
techniques including node-level statistics as well as characterizations
of the network's broader structural properties.
28
In order to contextualize what a particular observed social structure
implies, it is critical to remember that the social landscape need not
take any particular form. Scaffolding could indeed assume a variety
of flavors and there are causal mechanisms that act at the micro-level
to produce the observed macro-architecture. Specifically, macro-
system properties are a function of historical processes of positive
and negative feedback. Such processes can generate periods of
dynamical change followed by periods of relative stasis. However,
cascades across a network are far more likely in certain orientations
of the social world than in others. Therefore, it is important to
characterize the alternative network structures or 'states of the world'
and consider what these alternative states imply for the prospects of
doctrinal diffusion.
27. Although not the founder of network analysis, Jacob Moreno does deserve credit for the
development and modernization of social network analysis. Along with Kurt Lewin and Fritz Heider, the
first half of the twentieth century has been a period of dramatic progress for networks scholars. For
example, Moreno developed notions of "sociograms." See MORENO, supra note 2. Kurt Lewin extended
Moreno's work arguing the structural properties of social space could be uncovered using a host of
mathematical techniques including graph theory, topology, and set theory that link to sociology. See,
e.g., LEWIN, supra note 2.
28. Graph theory is the mathematical foundation for network analysis. In attempting to solve the
Konigsberg Bridge Problem, Leonhard Euler asked whether it is possible to traverse the seven bridges of
Konigsberg only once and close the circuit by returning to the point of origin. Euler demonstrated this
was not possible. With reference to the Konigsberg Bridge Problem, mathematicians ask whether "there
exists any Eulerian path on the network." See THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS, supra
note 2, at 2. For more on the life and work of Leonhard Euler, see C. EDWARD SANDIFER, THE EARLY
MATHEMATICS OF LEONHARD EULER (2007). For more information on graph theory see, e.g., GARY
CHARTRAND, INTRODUCTORY GRAPH THEORY (1985); FRANK HARARY, GRAPH THEORY (1969).
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II. STATES OF THE WORLD: THE CONSEQUENCES OF NETWORK
ORGANIZATION FOR SYSTEMIC CHANGE
The emergence of internal order is ubiquitous in the formation of
both natural and artificial systems. 29 Prior scholarship, drawn from a
variety of disciplines, observes how different processes of self-
organization can generate alternative structures, distributions of
authority, and levels of diffusion.30 Although attempts to measure and
describe self-organization are frequent, in considering the social
landscape judicial actors embrace, our analysis is limited to network
structures, their characteristics, and frequency distributions. Given
the same processes which generates the structure also produces the
characteristic or output distributions, the network structures and
frequency distributions feature an endogenous relationship. In order
to fully contemplate judicial decision-making and law's evolution,
we consider a variety of possible network structures, the
characteristics of these networks, and their likely generating
processes.
A. The Federal Judiciary and Dependence Networks
Dependence networks are graph theoretical representations of
processes that generate connections between nodes.3 1  These
29. MARK BUCHANAN, UBIQUITY: WHY CATASTROPHES HAPPEN (2002).
30. In one of the seminal works of network diffusion, James G. Anderson and Stephen J. Jay track
the dissemination of medical technology across different communities of doctors. James G. Anderson &
Stephen J. Jay, The Diffusion of Medical Technology: Social Network Analysis and Policy Research, 26
Soc. Q. 49 (1985). Though important, this work is by no means comprehensive. The relationship
between diffusion and network structure has been used to study a variety of issues including but not
limited to municipal reform, civil service reform, organizational structure, the poison pill dilemma in
business, and social epidemiology. For more detailed information, see Lawton R. Bums & Douglas R.
Wholey, Adoption and Abandonment of Matrix Management Programs: Effects of Organizational
Characteristics and Interorganizational Networks, 36 AcAD. MGMT. J., 106 (1993), Gerald F. Davis,
Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network, 36
ADMIN. SCa. Q. 583 (1991), David Knoke, The Spread of Municipal Reform: Temporal, Spatial, and
Social Dynamics, 87 AM. J. SOC., 1314 (1982), and E. 0. Laumann, J. H. Gagnon, S. Michaels, R. T.
Michael, & J. S. Coleman, Monitoring the AIDS Epidemic in the United States: A Network Approach,
244 SCIENCE 1186 (1989).
31. See MODELS AND METHODS IN SOCIAL NETwORK ANALYSIS 166 (Peter J. Carrington, John
Scott, & Stanley Wasserman, eds., 2005).
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processes are normally related to proximity of nodes or the already
existing distribution of connections. Given the dynamic nature of
social systems, specific network structures emerge as the direct by-
product of micro-level generating processes. For analytical ease, the
foregoing analysis will focus primarily upon characterizing networks
using their clustering and/or degree frequency distribution. If one
assumes that embedded in each directed connection is some degree of
influence from one actor to another, then the observed aggregate
network can offer insight into the prospect for change in subsequent
periods. As considered herein, network induced judge-level change
occurs when the probability of a judge supporting a particular policy
position is impacted by the policy positions taken by the community
of individuals with whom he or she shares social or professional
connections.
The variety of network structures, displayed infra, represent a
cursory overview of the possibility frontier for the self-organization
of the federal judiciary-where the nodes are the jurists and the
connections are a measure of influence, loosely defined as a social
and/or professional relationship between given jurists. Thus, if the
connections between actors connote influence between the agents,
then the actor to whom a connection is allotted would be the recipient
of that original person's esteem. All else equal, the higher the
indegree 32 for a node, the greater the influence enjoyed by that
node.33 With respect to diffusion, information passes through a given
dyad and is tagged by the recipient as positive or negative. 34 That
32. Indegree is a network analysis statistic that represents the aggregation of all connections to a
given node, where the arrows point to that node. See WOUTER DE NOOY, ANDREJ MRVAR, & VLADIMIR
BATAGEU, EXPLORATORY SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH PAJEK 321 (2005).
33. David Strang and Sarah A. Soule use other centrality measures as a possible measure of power or
influence in their dynamic model, but unfortunately they do not examine these effects and how they
interact with network structure, which is the basis of our analysis. See David Strang & Sarah A. Soule,
Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills, 24 ANN. REV.
Soc. 265 (1998).
34. In other simulation models, the commodity being diffused is not the positive or the negative tag,
but rather the people within the network who are in opposition to one another. In this model, the actors
have agency over the acceptance of information. See Devi R. Gnyawali & Ravindranath Madhavan,
Cooperative Networks and Competitive Dynamics: A Structural Embeddedness Perspective, 26 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 431 (2001).
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receiver can either resist the information with increased probability
when the tag is negative or probabilistically accept the information
when the tag is positive. 35 As this is a dynamic process, such
probabilities increase and decrease over time based upon the
influence differential between the actors as well as larger exogenous
forces not explicitly modeled herein.
Such an ebb and flow of influence within a social system is
consistent with intuitive understanding. Actors of higher influence, as
determined by indegree, should be better able to resist new ideas than
their less prestigious counterparts. At the same time, such prominent
actors are also more likely to disseminate ideas. Specifically,
although connections are often directed, the communication flow
between actors is bidirectional. The likelihood of the acceptance or
denial of the information is likely a function of the power dynamic
between agents. Yet, these power dynamics are not static as positive
and negative feedback loops abound. For example, the acceptance or
denial of a given idea at t=O can impact the relative standing of that
individual in subsequent periods. In order to consider the "evolution"
of the law, one must thus consider how a given network of judicial
actors adapts to temporal and spatial attempts at doctrinal change.
While certainly not exhaustive, the network structures discussed
infra represent several possible "states of the world." Each
hypothetical state offers different prospects for law's evolution-
where system level change is a function of variation in network
structure, degree distribution, and clustering. 36 With consideration of
35. The dynamic proposed in this model is similar to the SIS model described in the social
epidemiology literature, except the commodity being diffused in this case can be positive or negative
and the varying levels of acceptance or denial depend upon indegree. This extension is in part the value
of the study. For more on the SIS model, see Frank Ball, Stochastic and Deterministic Models for SIS
Epidemics Among a Population Partitioned into Households, 156 MATHEMATICAL BIOsCIENCES 41
(1999).
36. Economist and network scientist Matthew 0. Jackson summarizes several of the epidemiological
models for disease diffusion including the SIR model and previously mentioned SIS model. Jackson
explains how diffusion varies as network structure and degree distributions vary. Degree variance is
important because the probability of infection is directly impacted by the probability of interacting with
diverse nodes. For a detailed description, see generally MATTHEW 0. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
NETWORKS (2008). This model incorporates indegree as a measure of power as well, which increases
the ability to resist the infection, which in our case is referring to information and not a virus. Thus the
[Vol. 24:4
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the possibilities outlined herein, subsequent empirical research should
seek to identify which network structure, generating mechanism, and
corresponding dynamics best characterizes the federal judiciary.
1. Erdos-Renyi Random Graphs
Figure 1 is a random graph initially pictured in a ring lattice,
where the nodes are generated in a circular arrangement and the
probability of any node being connected to any other node is
independent. This structure is often called an Erdos-Renyi graph.a7
Figure 1 contains an alternative visualization of the network after the
Kamada-Kawai energizing algorithm has been applied. 38 The Erdos-
Renyi form of network structure is sometimes referred to as a
Bernoulli Dependence Graph, 39 because the ties assigned are a
product of the independently assigned probabilities associated with
the network. The probability of a connection between any two nodes
is independent of other connections and/or the proximity of the two
nodes. In repeated randomly generated networks or with a large
enough network, the degree frequency converges upon the Poisson
distribution.4 °
rate of transmission depends upon the aforementioned specification of the information as negative or
positive.
37. In 1959, Paul Erdos and Alfred Renyi designed these random networks, which are also referred
to as GnD or Gnm models. Although these networks are unlikely in the real world, they did launch
investigations into network structures and their properties. For more detailed information on these
graphs and their properties, see Paul Erdos, On Random Graphs, 6 PUBLICATIONES MATHEMATICAE 290
(1959); Paul Erdos & Alfred Renyi, The Evolution of Random Graphs, 5 MAGYAR TUD. AKAD. MAT.
KUTAT6 INT. KOZL 17 (1960).
38. See Tomishia Kamada & Satoru Kawai, An Algorithm for Drawing General Undirected Graphs,
31 Information Processing Letters 7 (1989).
39. "Bernoulli multigraphs assume conditional independence for all pairs of random variables
representing distinct pairs of individuals." MODELS AND METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS,
supra note 31, at 166.
40. These dynamics mathematically follow from the generating mechanisms described in the original
Erdos and Renyi graph, supra note 37, and further developed by Rtka Albert and Abert-LAszl6
Barabbisi, in STATISTICAL MECHANICS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS (2002).
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Figure 1: Erdos-Renyi Random
Dependence Networks
Ring LatticeE
If the federal judiciary organized itself as an Erdos-Renyi directed
network, very few jurists would have either great influence or very
little influence. However, time would have an appreciable effect on
the prestige of judges because the longer a given jurist remained in
the network the more exposure the agent would have to the
probabilistic attachment of connections. Given the random generating
mechanism, it is certainly possible the network would have some
localized clustering, but that clustering would not be systematic. If
one were to repeatedly simulate the generative process, clustering
should appear in random amounts and in random locations. 4 1
With respect to diffusion in this hypothetical state of the world,
new doctrinal approaches would spread across the network quickly,
but such cascades would be unlikely to occur because of the relative
equality in influence of the jurists. Additionally, although the
diffusion would occur quickly across most of the network, complete
consensus would lag because clustering is low. In evolutionary terms,
over a long period of time, a hypothetical judiciary organized under
such conditions would, on average, be resistant to change or
adaptation.42 In all, the Erdos-Renyi graph is an unlikely depiction of
41. See Albert & Barabisi, supra note 40.
42. See generally DUNCAN J. WATTS, SMALL WORLDS: THE DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS BETWEEN
ORDER AND RANDOMNESS (1999).
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the judicial social world. Specifically, influence relationships are
unlikely to form independently.
2. Neighborhood Clustered Networks
There are two simple ways to conceptualize highly clustered
networks and both are pictured in Figure 2. Network A is a ring
lattice, in which every node is connected to their immediate neighbor,
and their neighbors' neighbor.43 This is useful to conceptualize
clustering, but obviously is a rather narrow restriction that makes
difficult generalizations about substantive contexts. Accordingly, for
a more pragmatic illustration, consider Network B, in which nodes
are highly clustered and everyone within a community knows
everyone else in the given community. Network B is a clustered
network in which the probability increases for connections based
upon proximity, or degree separation between actors.44 These types
of networks are consistent with balance theory,45 which states that if
person A is connected to person B, and person B is connected to
person C, then it is likely that either person A will connect to person
C, or one of person B's bonds will break.
43. The visualization and operationalization of these graph theoretic models can be found in Watts &
Strogatz, supra note 2. However, the theoretical justification for the process that underlies and generates
these graphs has its roots in Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360
(1973), and see Milgram, supra note 2.
44. See MODELS AND METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS, supra note 31. Although several
different Markov graphs exist, we are specifically referencing the Markov star networks.
45. See D. Cartwright & Frank Harary, Structural Balance: A Generalization of Heider's Theory,
PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 277-92 (1956). The structural balance considered by these authors is essentially a
graph theoretic operationalization of Fritz Heider's theory about minimizing social psychological
discomfort in social relationships. See Fritz Heider, Attitudes and Cognitive Organization, J. PSYCHOL.
21, 107-12 (1946).
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Figure 2: Highly Clustered Networks
Network A Network B
In Network A, the generated connections are completely dependent
upon proximity, and the degree frequency distributions are uniform,
meaning that all nodes have the same degree. Network B will have a
conditionally uniform distribution with the average degree dependent
upon the size of the community to which the node is connected.
Accordingly, in such a highly clustered dependence network,
diffusion of new ideas would not occur quickly, but it would happen
predictably provided the connections are consistent with our prior
influence assumptions. 46 In the ring lattice, information would spread
methodically through proximity, while in the other clustered graph, it
would spread uniformly conditioned upon it reaching a given
community. It is worth noting that given the relatively equal levels of
influence, change could be stopped at any interval, by any individual
or community. Furthermore, information would likely not permeate
communities that initially resisted the change. With respect to law's
evolution, if the federal judiciary self-organized as a clustered
network, the network would likely display insular communities that
evolve differently from one another, with intra-community
consensus, and inter-community divergence. Also, greater degrees of
clustering and influence equality would produce the greater number
46. This is the logical extrapolation of the generating process. If each node in each separate
community is interconnected, we can assume that change will quickly take hold in that community.
However, transfer to alternative communities would be unlikely. See JACKSON, supra note 36.
[Vol. 24:4
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of communities.47 Finally, if clusters or neighbors are further
characterized by homophily,48 which implies sameness across nodes,
it is likely that greater consensus would follow when those
characteristics correlate with opinions or predispositions. In practical
terms, possible communities within the federal judiciary could
generate along a variety of social, ideological, geographic and
institutional dimensions.
3. Watts and Strogatz Small World Networks
In many ways, small world networks are the amalgam of clustered
networks and Erdos-Renyi dependent graphs. Watts and Strogatz
hypothesized that highly clustered networks could have small world
properties if only few of the connections throughout the network
were randomly rewired.49 Their simulation model allowed the
network to maintain its clustered nature while lessening the number
of links needed to reach any individual node from any other node.
Figure 3: Small World Network
47. These outcomes follow from the generating processes described in MODELS AND METHODS IN
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS, supra note 31, and Albert & Barabisi, supra note 40.
48. See NOOY et al., supra note 32, at 320.
49. See Watts & Strogatz, supra note 2.
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 995 2007-2008
)    
.4     
 ily,48    
r  
   .  l 
    
  , , i   
  
t    
   
   
     
  
    
  i   
   
 
i   i       
 .  ,   a ra  
.  ooy t I.,  t  , t . 
.  tt   tr t ,  t  . 
19
Katz: Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the "Evolution" of
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
All else being equal, if the federal judiciary self-organized as a
Watts-Strogatz small world network, the diffusion of new doctrinal
approaches would occur rapidly. The randomly rewired connections
would prevent any individual's attempt to halt dissemination, as the
bridges that span across communities provide alternative pathways to
the blocked communities.50 At the same time, the network would not
be completely egalitarian as the bridge nodes serve in structurally
important positions. Specifically, such actors would be
disproportionately important in generating a collective conception.
5 1
If a critical mass of such bridge jurists simultaneously resisted a
given change, the dynamics of this system would mimic the
properties associated with the highly clustered neighborhood ring
lattice. Accordingly, change would occur quickly if adopted by large
proportions of the jurists who are largely equal in influence, but
consensus would be rare given the size of the network.
52
4. Barabdsi and Albert Preferential Attachment (Scale-Free)53
Barabdsi and Albert networks generate from a micro-level
preferential attachment mechanism. In the model, a given node
prefers to connect to other nodes that already display high indegree.
54
As the number of connections a given agent displays is a function of
the number the agent possessed in earlier time periods, the
distribution of connections is highly susceptible to the initial starting
conditions. For instance, consider a network that has four nodes A, B,
C and D where A is connected to B and C is connected to D. If node
E enters the network, assume the initial probability of attachment to
50. The small world network as defined by Watts and Strogatz is a graph theoretic explanation for
the rapid spanning of a network. See Watts & Strogatz, supra note 2, at 440-42.
51. The uniform influence of which the model speaks is a product of the assumption of the model
that relates indegree to influence.
52. Namely, a mapping of the aggregate federal judiciary would contain in excess of one thousand
nodes.
53. Although popularized and extended by Albert-Lazlo Barabisi, the scale-free networks were
originally described by Derek J. de Solla Price, over 30 years earlier, which he termed cumulative
advantage. See Derek J. de Solla Price, Networks of Scientific Papers, 149 SCIENCE 510 (1965).
54. See BARABASI, supra note 2; THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS, supra note 2.
|Vol. 24:4
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the AB community is equal to that of the CD community. Once E
connects to either the AB or CD community, subsequent entrants
such as node F, G and beyond are more likely to connect with the
community selected by E. Complexity scholars have described a
number of phenomena that display this micro-process. Consider the
distribution of city size. If individuals are continuously moving and
in part choosing the city to which they move based upon the number
of people already in the city, then like the Barabdsi and Albert
network, the frequency distribution of city size will soon begin to
mimic the power law distribution.56 In the preferential attachment
model, nodes become clustered around centrally located nodes with
influence that is greatly disproportionate to the average degree of the
network. Preferential attachment models are also known as scale-free
or scale-invariant networks as their degree frequency distributions
tend to display power law properties.57
55. For further information on this generative process and the ubiquity of scale-free networks, see
Albert-LAszl6 Barabisi & Eric Bonabeau, Scale-Free Networks, 288 Sci. AM. 60 (2003); L.A.N.
Amaral, A. Scala, M. Barth~lmy, & H.E. Stanley, Classes of Small-World Networks, 97 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. Sci. 11149 (2000); Chavdar Dangalchev, Generation Models for Scale-free Networks, 338
PHYSICA A 659 (2004); M. E. J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45 SOc'y
INDUS. & APPLIED MATHEMATICS REV. 167 (2003); S. N. Dorogovtsev, J. F. F. Mendes, & A. N.
Samukhin, Structure of Growing Networks: Exact Solution of the Barabdsi-Albert's Model, 85 PHYSICS
REV. LETTERS 4633 (2000).
56. Xavier Gabaix, Zipfs Law for Cities: An Explanation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 739 (1999). Zipfian
distributions fall under the larger class of power law distributions.
57. See BARABASI & ALBERT supra note 2.
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Figure 4: Scale-Free Networks
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The presence of a power law distribution is evidence of a system
self-organized at a position of criticality. Self-organized criticality
describes a discrete process through which the agent-level micro-
motives yield a structure where small components of the system
organize in pockets and where small disturbances can have
unpredictable critical systemic impacts.58 Self-organized criticality is
normally seen when history builds upon itself implying actions at
present build pyramidally on the past. In other words, if bricks from
the base of the pyramid are simultaneously removed, large portions
of the pyramid will fall.
If the federal judiciary were self-organized at a position of
criticality, one would expect to observe long periods of time where
the network and perhaps its outputs where resistant to change. These
periods of stasis could be followed by relatively unpredictable
dramatic change initiated by jurists close to the central actors or by
the most central actors themselves. If the network had multiple hubs,
58. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 19, at 165. See also Per Bak, Chao Tang & Kurt Wiesenfeld,
Self-Organized Criticality: An Explanation of) If Noise, 59 Phys. Rev. Ltrs. 381 (1987); BAK supra
note 1I.
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jurists would cluster and create a small number of separate
communities that would resist change from the opposing community
because of the disproportionate power certain influence leaders have
in each community. As time moved forward, the dynamic system
would evolve such that the community would have sub-pockets and
the entire system could generate great change through a relatively
small disturbance in a structurally important pocket.
If the federal judiciary self-organized at criticality, then a case
considered salient to a fairly small subset of the network could induce
widespread emergent agreement by large portions of the network.
Additionally, the institution would be resistant to random failures.
Thus, should several jurists be resistant to a given emergent doctrinal
interpretation that change would continue regardless of their
resistance unless those resistant judges were central hubs. In other
words, this structure is simultaneously conducive to stasis and to a
doctrinal phase transition-if the right shock, struck the right pocket,
then systemic legal change would obtain, perhaps followed by a hill-
climbing like process on the new fitness landscape.
B. Social Influence and Yule's Law
The exploration of possible dependence networks motivates the
exploration of the nature of influence and prestige, and how these
attributes accumulate. In order to understand social influence,
consider first the temporal accumulation of wealth. Yule's Law helps
explain a dynamic process of wealth generation 59 where the greater
amount of money person x1 possesses at an initial starting condition
to the greater percent interest a person will receive on that quantity
of money when measured at the conclusion of the first time interval
t1 . The principle and the accrued interest from t, provides relative
increases in the interest earned in the subsequent time period t 2 .
Thus, as t => o, Yule's Law describes the process of rapid growth,
where the percentage return on a commodity is dependent upon the
59. Mark Newman, Power Laws, Pareto Distributions and Zipfs Law, 46 CONTEMP. PHYSICS 323
(2005).
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initial size of that commodity. Even small initial differences in
resources among agents in the system can produce large disparities in
wealth because the process is highly sensitive to initial conditions. In
other words, for two different quantities of money (x 1 and x 2 ), the
amount of money at a given time interval tn is dependent upon the
amount n of intervals elapsed and the difference between the two
starting conditions (x, and x 2).
In a dynamic system with a relatively large population, after
multiple iterations, the resulting distribution typically follows a
power law, where a small number of individuals possess a widely
disproportionate percentage of the overall wealth. Observing a highly
skewed distribution begs a question: what function generated such a
distribution? In a dynamic system, with a large population size, a
process similar to Yule's Law or the previously described preferential
attachment processes are likely hypotheses.
III. TOWARD A POSITIVE THEORY OF JUDICIAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The process of legal change and aggregate judicial decision-
making is undoubtedly impacted by actors, institutions, and social
forces exogenous to the judicial branch.60  However, within the
judicial branch, a social institution where scholars have consistently
found differential levels of social esteem--even across actors with
equivalent levels of formal authority, 61 the great weight of the
available evidence implies that "peer effects" matter.
60. This clear statement is an effort to avoid the type of overreaching that is at the core of the dispute
between popular science author Malcom Gladwell and networks scientist Duncan Watts. See Clive
Thompson, Is the Tipping Point Toast?, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/122/is-
the-tipping-point-toast.html (quoting Professor Watts "If society is ready to embrace a trend, almost
anyone can start one-and if it isn't, then almost no one can.... To succeed with a new product, it's less
a matter of finding the perfect hipster to infect and more a matter of gauging the public's mood.").
Returning to the claims asserted herein and in an effort to avoid any Gladwellian overreaching, it is
important to clearly assert that issue or idea salience together with social structure and exogenous forces
ultimately dictate whether a cascade will or will not follow.
61. See, e.g., David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. Legal Stud. 371 (1999); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig &
Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J.
Legal Stud. 271 (1998).
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The complete adjudication of either the presence or corresponding
magnitude of such "peer effects" is an empirical question beyond the
scope of this article. However, we hope future research designed to
answer these questions will be aided by the effort contained herein.
Specifically, working from the assumption that different forms of
social architecture consequence aggregate decision outputs in
differential manners, the article provides a sweep across the
possibility frontier. By considering the various states that the social
world could assume and the micro level process that could plausibly
produce them, we hope to motivate development of a positive theory
of judicial social structure-theory that could be well seated under
the larger umbrella of positive political theory.
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